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Abstract 
We recently described a formalism for rea­
soning with if-then rules that are expressed 
with different levels of firmness [18]. The 
formalism interprets these rules as extreme 
conditional probability statements, specify­
ing orders of magnitude of disbelief, which 
impose const1·aints over possible rankings of 
worlds. It was shown that, once we compute 
a priority function z+ on the rules, the de­
gree to which a given query is confirmed or 
denied can be computed in O(lob rl.) proposi­
tional satisfiability tests, where n is the num­
ber of rules in the knowledge base. In this 
paper, we show that computing z+ requires 
O(n2 x logn) satisfiability tests, not an ex­
ponential number as was conjectured in [18], 
which reduces to polynomial complexity in 
the case of Horn expressions . Vi'e also show 
how reasoning with imprecise observations 
can be incorporated in om formalism and 
how the popular notions of belief ret,ision and 
epistemic entrenchment are embodied natu­
rally and tractably. 
1 Introduction: Infinitesimal 
Probabilities, Rankings and 
Common Sense Reasoning 
The uncertainty encountered in com�r :·n sense reason­
ing fluctuates over an extremely wide range. For ex­
ample, the probability that the new book on my desk 
is about astrology is less than one in a million. If how­
ever, I spot a Zodiac sign on page 1. the probability 
becomes close to 1, say 0.999. Intelligent agents are 
expected to reason with such rare eventualities and to 
produce explanations and actions whenever these oc­
cur. Given this wide range of uncertainty fluctuations 
and the fact that the majority of everyday decisions in­
volve relatively low payoffs, the full precision of prob­
ability calculus may not be necessary, and a.n ordei'­
of-magnitude approximation may be sufficient . Thus, 
instead of measuring probabilities on a scale from zero 
t.o one, we can imagine projecting probability measures 
onto a quantized logarithmic scale and then treating 
beliefs that map onto two different quanta as being of 
different orders of magnitude. 
This method of approximation gives rise to a semi­
qualitative calculus of uncertainty, one in which de­
grees of ( dis)belief are ranked by non-negative integers 
(corresponding perhaps to linguistic quantifiers such as 
"believable," "unlikely," "very rare") still capable of 
accounting for retraction and restoration of beliefs by 
Bayesian conditionalization. The origin of this approx­
imation can be traced back to Ernest Adams [1], who 
developed a logic of conditionals based on infinitesimal 
probabilities, and to the Ordinal Condition Functions 
of Spohn (29]. Potential applications in nonmonotonic 
reasoning were noted in [21, 23] and further developed 
in (20, 16, 25, 17, 18, 8]. 
A simple way of viewing infinitesimal probabilities is 
to consider an ordinary probability function P defined 
over a set n of possible worlds (or states of the world) 
w and to imagine that the probability P(w) is a poly­
nomial function of some infinitesimal parameter <:, ar­
bitrarily close to, yet bigger than zero; for example 
1 - c1t: or t:2- c2t:4• Accordingly, the probabilities as­
signed t.o any subset of n represented by a logical for­
mula t.p, as well as all conditional probabilities P('li'[!f'), 
will be rational functions of<:. We define the ranking 
function �( 1/•l'f') 1 as the power of the most significant 
e--term in the expansion of P( 'li'I'P ). In other words, 
�(¢jt.p) = n iff P('ifl:p) has the same order of magni­
tude as e". 
The following properties of ranking functions (left­
hand side below) reflect, on a logarithmic scale, the 
usual properties of probability functions (right-hand 
side) , with "min" replacing addition, and addition re­
placing multiplication: 
�(:p) = min ��:(w) 
wl='l' 
P(t.p) = 2: P(w) (1) 
wl='l' 
P(t.p) + P(-ot.p) = 1 (2) 
1 Spohn [29J called this function a "non-probabilistic" 
Ordinal Condition Function. 
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P(r/J A .p) = P(r/JI<p)P(\0) 
(3) 
Parameterizing a probability measure by c: and ex­
tracting the lowest exponent of c: as the measure of 
(dis)belief is proposed as a model of the process by 
which p eople abstract qualitative beliefs from numer­
ical probabilities and accept them as tentative truths. 
For example, we can make the following correspon­
dence between linguistic quantifiers and en: 
P(<P)=e:
o <P and -.¢ are believable �>(</J)- 0 
P(<P)- e:' -.¢ is believed �<;(4>)- 1 
P(fjJ)- e:" -.¢ is strongly believed �>(¢)- 3 
P(<P)- e:3 -.¢ is very strongly believed �>(¢)
- 3 
These approximations yield a probabilistically sound 
calculus, employing integer addition, fr,r manipulating 
the orders of magnitude of disbelief. The resulting 
formalism is governed by the following principles: 
1. Each world is ranked by a non-negative integer K 
representing the degree of surprise associated with 
finding such a world. 
2. Each well-formed formula (wff) is given the rank 
of the world with the lowest �< (most normal 
world) that satisfies that formula. 
3. Given a collection of facts¢, we say that 17 follows 
from ,P with strength 6 if 1;(17!¢) > 6, or, equiv­
alently, if the K rank of ¢ /\ -,17 is at least 6 + 1 
degrees above that of ¢ /\ u. 
Principles 1 and 2 follow immediately from the scman­
t�cs de�cribed �bove. Principle 3 says that 17 is plau­
Sible g1ven ¢ Iff ?(1711/J) 2:: 1 - cc6, where P is the 
c�parametri�ed probability associated with that par­
tlcular rankmg "-· This abstraction of probabilities 
matches the notion of plain belief in ,,l tat it is deduc­
tively closed;� .tl.lC price we pay, however, is that many small probabthtles do not accumulate into a strong ar­
gument (as in the lottery paradox). 
The ?asic K ranki�g system, as described in Spohn [29], 
r�qmres the spenfication of a complete ranking func­
tiOn before reasoning can commence. In othe1· words, 
the knowledge base must be sufficiently rich to define 
the K associated with every world w. Unfortunatelv 
in practice, such specification is not readily availabl�
·
. 
For example, we might be given the information that 
"birds �ormally fly" (written �.:(-.Jib) > 0) and no in­
f�rmatlOn whatsoever about the flying habits of red 
buds or non-birds. \Ve still would like to conclude that 
red birds normally fly, even though the information 
2If A is believed and B is believed then AI\B is believed. 
�ate. that this deviates form the threshold conception of be­
lief: If both P( A) and P( B) are above a certain threshold 
P( A 1\ B) may still be below that same threshold. 
' 
given is not sufficient for defining a complete ranking 
function. In order to draw plausible conclusions from 
such fragmentary pieces of information, we require ad­
ditional inferential machinery that should accomplish 
two functions: First, it should enrich the specification 
of the ranking function with the needed information 
and, second, it should operate directly on the speci­
fication sentences in the knowledge base, rather than 
on the rankings of worlds (which are too numerous to 
list). Such machinery is provided by a formalism called 
system-z+ [18] which accepts knowledge in the form of 
quantified if-then rules (e.g., "birds fly (with strength 
6)") and computes the plausibility of any given query 
(e.g., "Tim, being a red-bird, flies (with degree 6')") 
by syntactic manipulation of these rules. 
To accomplish these functions, system-z+ incorpo­
rates two principles in addition to those given above: 
4. Each input rule "if r.p then '1/J ( with strength 6)," 
written r.p � 1/J, is interpreted as a constraint on 
the ranking ,., forcing every world in <p 1\ -,'ljJ to 
rank at least 6 + 1 degrees above the most normal 
world in r.p, that is, ��:(!fl<p) > 6. 
5. Out of all rankings satisfying the constraints 
above, we adopt the (unique) ranking ,_+ that as­
signs each world the lowest possible (most normal) 
rank. 
�rinciple 4 corresponds to the notion of consistency 
m Def. 2.2, and Principle 5 establishes that the in­
forma�ion in the set of if-�he.
n rules (the knowledge 
base) IS completed by asstgnmg the maximum like­
lihood possible to each world allowed by the consis­
tency constraints imposed by these rules (see Def. 2.3 
and [18]). The first contribution of this paper is to 
improve the inference process of system-z+ and es­
tablish its tractability. A key step in the procedures 
developed in [18] was the computation of a priority 
ranking z+ on the rules in the knowledge base, which 
was conjectured to be intractable. In Section 3 (after 
some preliminary definitions in Section 2), we present 
a pr?cedure for computing z+ that requires a poly­
llOITIIal number of propositional satisfiability tests and 
hence is tractable in applications permitting restricted 
languages, such as Horn expressions, network theories, 
or acyclic databases. 
The second contribution of this paper is to equip 
�ystem-Z� with �he capability to reason with soft ev­
tdenc� ?r 1�n�ree�se observations (Section 4). Such a 
capab1hty 1s Important when we wish to assess the 
plausibility of u (using Principle 3 above) but the con­
text ¢ is not given with absolute certainty. In other 
words, there is some vague testimony supporting ,p but 
th�t testimony is undisclosed (or cannot be articulated 
usmg the basic propositions in our language, e.g., tes­
tunony of the senses); all that can be ascertained is a 
summary of that testimony saying that ",P is supported 
to a. degre� n." We propose two different strategies 
for computmg a new ranking �<' from an initial one 1£ 
' 
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given soft evidential report supporting a wff 4J. The 
first strategy, named J-conditionalization, is based on 
Jeffrey's Rule of Conditioning [24]. It interprets the re­
port as specifying that "all things considered," the new 
degree of disbelief for -.¢should be �>'(-.¢) = n. The 
second strategy, named L-conditionalization, is based 
on the virtual evidence proposal described in [2 3]. It 
interprets the report as specifying the desired sllift in 
the degree of belief in ¢, as warranted by that report 
alone and "nothing else considered." We show that 
L-conditionalization has roughly the same complexity 
as ordinary conditionalization, and then we relate our 
formalism to the theory of belief revision in [2]. Fi­
nally, Section 5 summarizes the mai1: ::esults. 
2 Preliminary Definitions: The 
Ranking,..+ 
We start with a set of rules � = { 1'; I 1'; = tp; � 
t/Ji, 1 � i � n}, where r.p; and 1/;; are propositional 
formulas over a finite language of atomic propositions, 
"-" denotes a new connective, and 8; is a non-negative 
integer. A truth valuation w of the atomic propositions 
in the language will be called a world. The satisfaction 
of a wff r.p by a world w is defined as usual and denoted 
by w F r.p. w is a model for r.p if w satisfies r.p. Let n 
stand for the set of possible worlds. Ranking functions 
are defined as follows: 
Definition 2.1 (Rankings) A ranking function�> 
is an assignment of non-negative integers to the ele­
ments in n, such that �>(w) = 0 for at least one world 
w E n. We extend this definit.ion to 1•1duce rankings 
on wffs: 
��:
( ) = 
{ mi11w1=.., ��:(w) if t.p is.satisfiable, 'P oo otherWise. (
4) 
Similarly, given two wffs 'P and 1j; such that r.p is sat­
isfiable , we define the conditional ranking ��:( 1/!lr.p) as 
1'( t/Jjcp) = "'( tJ! A cp) - K( 'P ). 
Definition 2.2 (Consistency) A ranking ��: is said 
to be admissible relative to a given �. iff 
��:(cp; (\ tPi) + 8; < h:(tp; 1\ -.ljJi) (5) 
(equivalently �>(...,ti';jr.p;) > 6;) for every rule r.p; � t/.•; E 
�. A set � is consistent iff there exists an admissible 
ranking K relative to �. 
Consistency can be decided in 0(1�12) satisfiability 
tests , and it is independent of the 8-values assigned to 
the rules in 6. [18]. Eq. 5 echoes the usual interpreta­
tion of defaults rules [28}, according t J which 1/.> holds 
in all minimal models for r.p. In our case, minimality 
is reflected in having t.l1e lowest rank, that is the high­
est possible likelihood. If we say that w falsifies or 
violates a rule r.p !.... lj! whenever w F 'P 1\ -,'lj_•, the pa­
rameter {) can be interpreted as the minimal degree of 
surprise (or abnormality) associated with finding the 
rule r.p !.... 1/.> violated, given that we know r.p. In prob­
abilistic terms, consistency guarantees that for every 
c > 0, there exists a probability distribution P such 
that if 'Pi � 1/.>i E 6., then P( 1/.>;lr.p;) � 1- cc6;. 
The distinguished ranking ,_+, defined below, assigns 
to each world the lowest possible rank permitted by 
the admissibility constraints of Eq. 5 (Def. 2.2). Such 
an assignment reflects the assumption that, unless we 
are forced to do otherwise, each world is considered as 
normal (likely) as possible. 
Definition 2.3 (The ranking,.+) Let � = {r; I 
r; = 'Pi � 1/.>i} be a consistent set of rules. ,.+ IS 
defined as follows: 
,.+(w) _ { 0 if w does not falsify any rule in �. (6) - max..,1=10,".,.p, [Z+(r;)] + 1 otherwise, 
where z+ (r;) is a priority ranking on rules, defined by 
z+(r;) = min [x:+(w)] + 8;. (7) "'F"''""'' 
The recursive nature between Eqs. 6 and 7 is be­
nign, and we present an effective procedure, Procedure 
Z_rank, for computing z+ in the next section. In [18], 
we also show that Eqs. 6 and 7 define a unique admis­
sible ranking function ,.+ that is minimal in the fol­
lowing sense: Any other admissible ranking function 
must assign a higher ranking to at least one world and 
a lower ranking to none. 
An alternative mechanism for enriching the original 
specification of a ranking (probability) function in the 
form of a set of conditional if-then rules is studied 
in [17], where Maximum Entropy principle is used to 
select a privileged distribution among those probabil­
ity distributions complying with the constraints im­
posed by the rules. In the language of rankings, this 
distribution can be represented as a set of recursive 
equations similar to Eqs. 6 and 7:3 
,.•
(w)
:::: { 0 if w does
. 
n?t falsify any rule �n �. (8) 
L:w!=<p,i\.,.p.[Z ( r, )] + 1 otherWISe. 
The computation of the z• priorities and the query­
answering procedures for the ma.ximum entropy ap­
proach has been proven to be NP-hard even for Horn 
clauses (see [4]). 
3 Plausible Conclusions: Computing 
the z+-rank 
Given a set �. each admissible ranking h: induces a 
consequence relation �· where ¢ � cr iff ��:( cr A¢) < 
��:( ..,cr 1\ ¢> ) . A straightforward way to declare cr as 
a plausible conclusion of � given ¢> would be to re­
quire 4J � cr in all x: admissible with �. This leads 
3The equation for z• is identical to that of z+ (with 
K+ replaced with ,;;•). 
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to an entailment relation called e:-semantics [23], 0-
entailment [25], and r-entailment (20], which is recog­
nized as being too conservative. The approach we take 
here is to select a distinguished admissible ranking, in 
our case ��:+, and declare u as a plausible conclusion of 
�given¢, written¢ kr -y, iff K+(¢1\ ff\ < ��:+(¢/\•0").4 
According to Eq. 6 in Def. 2.3, both ��:+ and I+ 
can be computed effectively once the priority rank­
ing z+ on rules is known. We next present a pro­
cedure for computing z+' which is identical to the 
one presented in [18] save for the crucial computation 
of Eq. 9 (Step 3(b) ). Whereas in [18] this computa­
tion was thought to require an exponential search over 
worlds, we now show that it can be accomplished in 
0(1�1 x log 1�1) satisfiability tests. Some of the steps 
in Procedure Z_rank depend upon the notion of tol-
eration. A rule ¢ .!.... O" is tolerated by � if the wff 
¢ 1\ O" /\; 'Pi ::> tPi is satisfiable (where i ranges over all 
rules in �).5 
Procedure Z..rank 
Input: A consistent knowledge base �. Output: z+­
ranking on rules. 
1. Let �0 be the set of rules tolerated by �. and let 
nz+ be an empty set. 
2. For each rule 1'; = 'Pi � 1/Jj E �o. do: set Z(r;) = 
6; and nz+ = nz+ u {ri}. 
3. While nz+ #- �. do: 
(a) Let � + be the set of rules in �I = �- nz+ 
tolerated by �� 
(b) 6 For each r : ¢ - (1 E � +, let r.lr denote the 
set of models for ¢ 1\ l1 that do not violate any 
rule in f:..': compute 
Z(1·) == min [n:(w,.)] + b (9) Wrtnr 
where n:(wr ) = 
max {Z(rj)lwrF'Pj/\•1/;j}+l (10) rienz+ 
�i + 6 and ri : 'Pi ---. tPi E 'RZ . 
(c) Let r• be a rule in fl.+ having the lowest Z; set 
nz+ = n.z+ u {r*}. 
End Procedure 
Theorem 3.1 establishes the correctness of Procedure 
Z_rank, while Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 and Theorem 3.4 
determine its (polynomial) complexity. 
•u we are concerned with the strength fJ wit.h which 
the conclusion is endorsed, then¢> J{- "I iff,..+(¢> Au)+ fJ < 
K+(!/1 A -.u). 
!>The notion of toleration is also crucial for deciding con­
sistency : ll. is consistent iff there is a tolerated default rule 
in every nonempty subset ll.' of ll. (Theorem 1, [18]). 
6Note that Eqs. 9 and 10 correspond to Eqs. 7 and 6 in 
Def. 2.3. 
Theorem 3.1 ([18]) The function Z computed by 
Z_rank complies with De[ 2. 9, that is Z = z+ . 
�· Lemma 3.2 Let � = { l'i I r; = <p; � tPi} be a con-
sistent set where the rules are sorted in nondecreasing 
order according to priorities Z( ri). Let ��:(w) be defined 
as in Eq. 6: 
�>(w) = { 0 ifw
 does not falsify any rule in �. (ll) 
max_., I=.,.; " .... .p, [Z( r;)] + 1 athenmse. 
Then, for any wff ¢, ��:( ¢) can be computed m 
O(log I�IJ propositional satisfiability tests. 
The idea is to perform a binary search on � to find 
the lowest Z(1·) such that there is a model for¢ that 
does not violate any rule r1 with priority Z(r1) 2:: 
Z(t•). This is done by dividing � into two roughly 
equal sections: top-half (rmid to Thigh) and bottom­
half (rrow to rmid) · A satisfiability test on the wff 
a = ¢ /\� ��•id 'Pi :J tPi decides on whether the search 
should continue (in a recursive fashion) on the bottom­
half or on the top-half. 7 
Lemma 3.3 The value of Z(¢ .!.... O") in Eq. 9 can be 
computed in O(log IRZ+I) satisfiability tests. 
Let �� in Step 3(a) be equal to {'Pi � 1/J;}; the com­
putation of Eq. 9 is equivalent to computing the 11: of 
the wff O" 1\ ¢ /\i cp; ::> tPi where i ranges over all the 
rules in f:..', by performing the binary search on the set 
n.z+. 
Theorem 3.4 Given a consistent �� the computation 
of the ranking z+ requires 0( 1�12 x log 1�1) satisfia­
bility tests. 
Computing Eq. 9 in Step 3(b) can be done 
in O(log 1nz+ I) satisfiability tests according to 
Lemma 3.3,8 and since it will be executed at most 
0(1 �1) times, it requires a total of 0(1�1 x log 1�1). 
Loop 3 is performed at most 1�1- l�ol times, hence 
the whole computation of the priorities z+ on rules re­
quires a total of 0(1 �12 x log I �  I) satisfiability tests.9 
Once z+ is known, determining the strength fJ with 
which an arbitrary query O" is confirmed, given the 
information ¢, requires O(log 1�1) satisfiability tests: 
7 For reasons of space, formal proofs of Lemmas 3.2 
and 3.3, and Theorem 3.4 can be found in the Technical 
Report available by request. 
8Note that we need nz+ to be sorted, nondecreasingly, 
with respect to the priorities Z. This requires that the 
initial values inserted in nz+ in Ste p 2 of Procedure Z.rank 
be sorted - O(Jll.oJ2) data comparisons - and that the 
new Z-value in Step 3(c) be inserted in the right place­
O(i'R.z+ I) data comparisons. We are assuming that the 
cost of each of these operations is much less than that of a 
satisfiability test. 
9The complexity of the remainding steps in the proce­
dure is bounded by O(jll.i) satisfiability tests. 
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First N:+(¢1\u) and N:+(¢1\"'""u) are computed, using a 
binary search as in Lemma 3.2. Then, these two val­
ues are compared and the difference is equated with 
the strength 6. Clearly, if the rules in � are of Horn 
form, computing the priority ranking z+ and decid-
ing the plausibility of queries ( ¢ 1{. (f) can be done in 
polynomial time [10]. 
4 Belief Change, Soft Evidence, and 
Imprecise Observations 
So far, a query ¢ If u was defined as a pair of Boolean 
formulae(¢, (f) , where ¢ (the context) stands for the 
set of observations at hand and u (the target) stands 
for the conclusion whose belief we wish to confirm, 
deny, or assess. A query (¢,(f) would be answered in 
the affirmative if (f was found to hold in all minimally 
ranked models of¢, and the degree of r:.elief in (f would 
be given by K(-.u 1\ ¢)- te(u 1\ ¢). 
In many cases, however, the queries we wish to answer 
cannot be cast in such a format, because our set of 
observations is not precise enough to be articulated as 
a crisp Boolean formula. For example, assume that 
we are throwing a formal party and our friends Mary 
and Bill are invited. However, judging form their pre­
vious behavior, we believe that "if Mary goes to the 
party, Bill will stay home (with strength 6)," writ-
ten M .!..... -.B. Now assume that we have a strong 
hunch (with degree K) that Mary will go to the party 
(perhaps because she is extremely well dressed and is 
not consulting the movie section in the Times) and we 
wish to inquire whether Bill will stay home. It would 
be inappropriate to query the system with the pair 
(M, -.B), because the context M has not been estab­
lished beyond doubt. The difference could be critical 
if we have arguments against "Bill staying home," for 
example, that he was seen renting a tuxedo. A flex­
ible system should allow the user to assign a degree 
of belief to each observational proposition in the con­
text ¢ and proceed with analyzing their rational con­
sequences. Thus, a query should consist of a tuple like 
(¢I.K1;¢2,K2; ... ,¢m,I<m: (f), where each/(; mea­
sures the degree to which the contextual proposition 
ifl; is supported by evidence.10 
At first glance it might seems that such facility is auto­
matically provided by system-z+, through the use of 
variable-strength rules. For example, to express the 
fact that Mary is believed to be going to the party , 
we can perhaps use a dummy rule Obs1 !i M (stating 
that if Mary meets the set of observations Obs1 then 
Mary is believed to be going to the party) and then 
add the proposition Obs1 to the context part of the 
query, to indicate that Obs1 has taken place. 
10We remark that evidence in this paper is regarded as 
setting the context of a query and not as a modifier of the 
knowledge in �- Statistical methods for •.l1e later task are 
explored in [3]. 
This proposal has several shortcomings, however. 
First, the net impact of our new rule Obs1 � M would 
be sensitive to previously collected information about 
Mary's intentions (say she has bought a plane ticket) 
that we may wish to suppress. In other words, we of­
ten wish to express the assessment that, all things 
considered, Mary's going to the party is believed to 
degree!(. 
Second, in many systems it is convenient to treat if­
then rules as a stable part of our knowledge, unper­
turbed by observations made about a particular indi­
vidual or in any specific set of circumstances. This 
permit.s us to compile rules into a structure that al­
lows efficient query processing. Adding query-induced 
rules to the knowledge base will neutralize this facility. 
Finally, mles and observations combine differently: 
The latter should accumulate the former do not. For 
example, if we have two rules a � c and b � c and 
we observe a and b, system-z+ would believe c to a 
degree max(61, 62). However, if a and b provide two in­
dependent reasons for believing c, the two observations 
together should endow c with a belief that is stronger 
than any one component in isolation. To incorporate 
such cumulative pooling of evidence, we must encode 
the assumption that a and b are conditionally indepen­
dent (given cj, which is not automatically embodied in 
system-z+ .1 
To avoid these complications, the method we propose 
treats imprecise observations by invoking specialized 
conditioning operators, unconstrained by a rule's se­
mantics. We distinguish between two types of eviden­
tial reports: 
1. Type-J: "All things considered," our current belief 
in ifJ should become J. 
2. Type-L: "Nothing else considered," our current 
belief in ¢ should shift by L. 
4.1 Type-J: All Things Considered 
Let ¢ be the wff representing the event whose belief we 
wish to update so that ,._, ( -..p) = J (and, consequently, 
�e'(¢) = 0).12 In order to compute K'(IP) for every wff 
1/J, we rely upon Jeffrey's Rule of Conditioning [24]. 
Jeffrey's rule is based on the assumption that while 
the observation changed the agent's degree of belief in 
¢ and in certain other proposition, it did not change 
the conditional degree of belief in any propositions 
on the evidence ¢ or on the evidence -..p [24]. Thus, 
letting P' denote the agent's probability distribution 
after the report on the value of P'( ifJ) is incorporated, 
11The assumptions of conditional independence among 
converging rules is embodied in the formalism of Maximum 
Entropy [17]. 
12This is an immediate consequence of the semantics for 
ra.nkings and corresponds to the normalization in proba­
bility theory (see Eq. 2). 
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and, using P to denote the agent's probability distri­
bution prior to this report, we have13 
P'(t/>1¢) = P('¢1¢) and P'(¢1•¢) = P(t,bl•¢ ) , (12) 
which leads to Jeffrey's rule, 
(13) 
Translated into the language of rankings {using Eqs. 1-
3), Eq. 13 yields 
K1(1/>) = min[n:(¢•1¢) + n:'(¢); �e(¢1-..,9) + n:'(•¢) ] , (14) 
which offers a convenient way of computing��:'(�·) once 
we specify N.'(¢) = 0 and 1i.1(•ifJ) = J. Eq. 14 assumes 
the an especially attractive form when computing the 
��:' of a world w: 
(15) 
Eq. 15 corresponds exactly to the a-conditionalization 
proposed in Spohn [29] (Def. 6, p. 117), with a= J. 
If �>.'(...,4>) = oo, this process is equivalent to ordinary 
Bayesian conditionalization, since k'(w) = k(wl¢) if 
w I=¢ and ��:'(w) = oo otherwise. Note, however, that 
in general this conditionalization is not commutative; 
if 'Pl and ¢z are mutually dependent (i.e., ��:(¢zl¢11) :f. 
"-(¢�2)),14 the order in which we establish t.:(•¢t) = J1 
and ��:( -.¢2) = h might make a difference in our final 
belief state, represented by the ranking k".15 
4.2 Type-L Reports: Nothing Else 
Considered 
L-conditionalization is appropriate for evidential re­
ports of the type "a new evidence was obtained which, 
by its own merit, would support ¢ to degree L." Un­
like J-conditionalization, the degree L now specifies 
changes in the belief of ¢, not the absolute value of 
the final belief in ,P. As in the case of type-J reports, 
we assume that in naming ¢ as the dit·ect beneficiary 
of the evidence, the intent is to convey the assumption 
of conditional independence, as formulated in Eq. 13. 
Next, we assume that the degree of support L charac­
terizes the likelihood-ratio ..\(ifJ) associated with some 
undisclosed observation Obs, as is done in the method 
of virtual conditionalizati on [23): 
..\(¢1) 
= P(Obsl¢) 
' P(Obsl•¢) 
13Eq. 12 is known as the J-cor1dition (24]. 
(16) 
14Tbis condition mirrors probabilistic dependence, i.e., 
P(.P2i.Pd ;f; P(¢12). 
lf>Spohn ((29], p. 118) has acknowledg, c1 the desirability 
of commutativity in evidence pooling but has not stressed 
that a-conditionalization commutes only in a very narrow 
set of circumstances (partially specified by his Theorem 
4). These circumstances require that. successive pieces of 
evidence support only propositions that are relatively inde­
pendent - the truth of one proposition should not imply a 
belief in another. Shenoy [2i) has corrected this deficiency 
by devising a commutative combiuation rule which behaves 
similar to 1-conditiouing. · 
which governs the updates via the product rule 
P'(<l>) ..\(¢)?(¢) 
-:::-:P,-:--( ...,....,..,..cP) = P ( • tP) . 
(17) 
Translated into the language of rankings, this assump­
tion yields 
�i'(ifJ)- �i'(•cP) = x:(cfo)- K(•</1)- L (18) 
and, since either "'(cfo) or K1(•<P) must be zero, we ob­
tain 
max[O; ��:.( ¢)- ��:.( -.¢)- L], (19) 
max[O; K(-.<jl)- ��:(¢) + L]. (20) 
We see that the effect of L-conditionalization is to shift 
the degree of disbelief difference between ¢ and -.,p by 
the specified amount L. Once"'(¢) is known, we can 
use Jeffrey's rule (Eq. 14) to compute the t.:'(¢) for an 
arbitrary wff 1/!, we have that��:'('!/!)= 
{ 
min[�i(¢1¢) + ��:(¢)- �.:(-.ifJ)- L; ��:(1/!1--,¢1)] 
min[��:( !PI¢); ��:(!J'I•<P) + �>(•¢) + L- "-(¢)) 
min[t.:('l/!1¢); ��:(1/•I...,<P)] 
(21) 
depending on whether ��:( •ifJ )+�i( <P) is less than, greater 
than, or equal to L. This expression takes the following 
form for ��:'(w): 
t.:'(w) _ { ��:(wl¢) + max[O; ��:.(¢�)- "-(•¢)- L] - x:(wl•¢) + max[O; ,_(-.¢�)- ��:(cfo) + L] (22) 
depending on whether w )= ¢> or w )= •¢1. As in J­
conditionalization, if L = oo then ��:.'(w) = K(wl</1). 
For the general case, we can see that the effect of 
L-conditionalization is to shift downward the K of all 
worlds that are models of the supported proposition ,P 
relaLive to the ,; of all worlds that are not models for 
<,b. However, unlike J-conditionalization, the net rela­
tive shift is constaut and is equal to L, independent 
of the initial value of x( ¢ ). It is easy to verify that 
L-conditionalization is commutative (as is its proba­
bilistic counterpart, see Eq. 17), and hence it permits 
a recursive implementation in the case of multiple ev­
idence. 
We can illustrate these updating schemes through the 
party example consisting of the single rule rm : M � 
-.B (''if Mary goes to the part.y, then Bill will not 
go"). A trivial application of Procedure Z_rank yields 
z+(,·m) = 4, and using Eqs. 4 and 6 we find x:(x) = 0 
for every proposition x, except x = B A fl,f, for which 
we have x+(!vf A B) = 5. This means that we have 
no reason to believe that either Mary or Bill will go 
to the party, but we are pretty sure that both of them 
will not show up. Now suppose we see that Mary is 
very well dressed, and this observation makes our be­
lief in I\1 increase to 3, that is, ��:+' (--,Af) = 3. As a 
consequence, our belief in Bill staying home also in­
creases to 3 since, using either J-conditionalization or 
L-conditionalization, ��:+'(B) = 3. Next, suppose that 
someone tells us that he has a strong hunch that Bill 
plans to show up for the party, but he fails to tell us 
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why. There are two ways in which this report can influ­
ence our beliefs. The natural way would be to assume 
that our informer has not seen Ivlary's dress, and might 
not even be aware of Bill and Mary'" relationship -
hence we assess the impact of his report in isolation 
and say that whatever the value of our current belief 
in Bill going, it should increase by 3 increments , or 
fj +" L = 3. Following Eq. 21 ,  ��:+ (B) and K (-.M) will 
both be equal to 0, and we are back to the initial un­
certainty about Bill or Mary going to the party, except 
that our disbelief in both :Mary and Bill being at the 
party has decreased to ,_+" (M /1. B) = 2. The second 
way would be to assume that our informer is omni­
scient and already has taken into consideration all we 
know about Bill and Mary. He means for us to revise 
our rankings so that the final belief in ''Bill going" will 
be fixed at ��:+" (-.B) = 3. With this interpretation, we 
J-condition ��:+' on the proposition ¢ =  -.B and obtain 
,;;+" (M) = 3, concluding that it is Mary who will not 
show up to the party after all. 
4.3 Complexity Analysis 
From Eq. 14 we see that x:' ('l/.') can b• computed from 
x:(tf>i¢) and ��:(¥>1•¢) ,  which, assuming we have z+ , 
requires a logarithmic number of propositional satisfi­
ability tests (see Section 3). L-conditionalization can 
follow a similar route, as depicted in Eq. 21. 
Special precautions must be taken when simultaneous, 
multiple pieces of evidence become available. First, J­
conditionalization is not commutative, hence we can­
not simply compute ,;,' by J-conditioning on ¢1 and 
then J-conditioning K1 on 1>2 to get. K-11 • We must J­
condition simultaneously on ¢ 1  and ¢2 with their re­
spective J-levels, say h and Jz. Worse yet, an auxil­
iary effort must be expended to compute the J-level of 
each combination of ¢'s ,  in our case ¢1 /1. ¢z , ¢1 1\ •¢2, 
etc. This is no doubt a hopeless computation when 
the number of observations is large. 
1-conditionalization, by virtue of it.s commutativity, 
enjoys the benefits of recursive computations. Let e 1  
and e2 be two (undisclosed) pieces of evidence sup­
porting ¢1 (with strength L1 ) and ¢· (with strength 
L2 ) ,  respectively. We first 1-condittun ,;; on ljJ1 and 
calculate ��:'(¢ 1 )  and ,;:'(¢>2) using Eq. 20 and Eq. 21, 
respectively. Applying Eq. 21 this time to ,;,1('1/1 1\ ¢2),  
we calculate ,;;'(tf>l¢2 ) .  Second, we L-condition ��:' on 
¢2, compute K;11(¢2) using Eq. 20, and, finally, using 
x:'(tf> l¢2) and ,;:"(¢2 ) in Eq. 21 obtain ,;,"(iJ·)Y' Note 
that, although each of these calculations requires only 
O(log I� I) satisfiability tests, this computation is ef­
fective only when we have a well designated target 
hypothesis tjJ to est.ima.te. The computation must be 
repeated each time we change the target hypothesis, 
even when the context remains unaltered. This is so 
because we no longer have a faci lity for encoding a 
16The generalization to more than two pieces of evidence 
is straightforward. 
complete description of x:' , as we had for K (using the 
z+ -function) .  Thus, the encoding for K:1 may not be as 
economical as that for K (the number of worlds is astro­
nomical) ,  unless we manage to find dummy rules that 
emulate the constraints imposed on ¢1 by the (undis­
closed) observation. Such dummy rules must enforce 
the conditional independence constraints embedded in 
Eq. 13, without violating the admissibility constraints 
(Eq. 5) in � (see [19] ) .  
4.4 Relation to the AGM Theory of Revision 
Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson (AGM) have 
advanced a set of postulates that have become a stan­
dard against which proposals for belief revision are 
tested [2] .  The AG M approach models epistemic states 
as deductively closed sets of (believed) sentences and 
characterizes how a rational agent should change its 
epistemic states when new beliefs are added, sub­
stracted, or changed . The central result of this theory 
is that these postulates are equivalent to the existence 
of a complete preordering of all propositions according 
to their degree of epistemic entrenchment such that 
belief revisions always retain more entrenched propo­
sitions in preference to less entrenched ones. However, 
the AGM postulates do not provide a calculus with 
which one can realize the revision process or even spec­
ify the content of an epistemic state [5, 1 1 , 22] . 
Spohn (29] has shown how belief revision conforming 
to the AGM postulates can be embodied in the con­
text of ranking functions. Once we specify a single 
ranking function K on possible worlds, we can asso­
ciate the set of beliefs with those propositions tf> for 
which ,;;( •1/•) > 0. To incorporate a new belief j3, 
one can raise the x: of all models of -.j3 relative to 
those of J], until k(-.j3) becomes (at least) 1, at which 
point the newly shifted ranking defines a new set of 
belief.<; . This process of belief revision, corresponding 
to a·-conditioning (with a = 1) was shown to obey the 
AGM postulates, from which it follows that revision 
in the probabilistic. system described in this paper also 
obeys those postulates under the same interpretation 
of beliefs. 
Stil l ,  neither the AGM theory nor Spohn's embodi­
ment of the theory are directly applicable to AI sys­
tems, the former because it does not provide a finite 
specification for belief sets and their entrenchment or­
dering, and the latter because it requires an explicit 
encoding of the ranking function on all possible worlds. 
To better model AI practice, Nebel [22) adapted the 
AGM theory so that finite sets of base propositions 
mediate revisions. This is exemplified in the nonmono­
tonic systems of Brewka [7] and Poole [26] , where the 
base consists of propositional implications, or expecta­
tions [15] .  The basic idea in these syntax-based sys­
tems is to define a (total) priority order on the set of 
base propositions, and select revisions to be maximally 
consistent relative to that order . Nebel has shown that 
such a. strategy, can satisfy almost all the AGM ax-
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ioms. Boutilier [5] has further shown that, indeed, the 
priority function z+ corresponds naturally to the epis­
temic entrenchment ordering of the AGI\1 theory. 1 7  
Unfortunately, even Nebel 's theory does not com­
pletely succeed at formalizing the practice of belief re­
vision, as it does not specify how the priority order on 
the base propositions is to be determined. Although 
one can imagine, in principle, that the knowledge au­
thor specify this order in advance, such specification 
would be impractical, since the order might (an d ,  as 
we h ave seen, should) change whenever new rules are 
added to the knowledge base. 
Thus we see that there are several computational and 
epistemological advantages to our system over those 
proposed by AG M and Spoh n ,  stemming fmm the fact 
that our revision process revolves armmd a finite set 
of conditional rules, not around the beliefs ,  the rank­
ings or t he expectations that emanate from those rules. 
First , since the number of propositions in one's belief 
set is astronomical, and so is the number of worlds, i t  
i s  a computational necessity t o  base belief revision on 
rules, whose number is usual ly manageable. Second,  
our system extracts both beliefs and rankings of be­
l iefs automatically from the content of 6. ;  no outside 
specification of belief orderings is required. 
Thir d ,  in order to facilitate recovery from obsolete ob­
servations Spohn 's framework m ust assume that all 
observations are defeasible (or imprecise),  which corre­
sponds to a-conditioning with a < oo .  In our system, 
we can accommodate both imprecise and precise obser­
vations (corresponding to a = oo) using ordinary con­
ditioning. Given a set of precise observations ¢, the set 
of beliefs is defined as those propositions u for which 
,_( --,ul¢) > 0. Retraction of obsolete observations can 
be done by simply removing those observations from 
¢; .  This flexibility is facilitated by mil ' ; 1taining a fixed 
set of conditional rules ,  w ith the help uf which one can 
always restore beliefs (and rankings) so that. they re­
flect t he observations at hand,  i ndependently of those 
seen in the past. 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, our system is 
capable of responding not merely to empirical obser­
vations but also to linguistically transmitted infonna­
tion such as conditional sentences ( i . e . ,  if-then rules ) .  
For example, suppose someone tells us that 1\I ary too 
tries to avoid Bill in parties; we simply add this in­
formation to our knowledge base in the form of a new 
rule, B - ...,_H , recompute z+ , and are prepared to 
respond to new observations or hearsay. In Spohn's 
system, where revisions are limited to a-conditioning, 
one cannot properly revise beliefs in response to con-
1 7The proof in [.5] considers the priorities z+ resulting 
from a fiat set. of rules {<,�, � d•, } ,  namely one in which 
all b, 's are 0, as in system-Z [25] . Bout i l  •'I" abo shows [6] 
that an entrenchment ordtriug obeying the AGM frame­
work obtains from the Z priorities of the negations of the 
material counterpart of rules. 
ditional statements. 18 
Having the capability of adopting new conditionals (as 
rules) also provides a simple semantics for interpreting 
more complex sentences i nvolving conditionals (e .g. ,  
"If you wear a helmet whenever you ride a motorcycle, 
then you wont get hurt badly if you fall" 19) .  Both 
nested and negated conditionals cease to be a mystery 
once we permit explicit references to defaul t  rules. The 
sentence "If (a ___. b) then ( c __,. d)" is interpreted as: 
"If I add the default a - b to t., the n (c, d) 
will be in the consequence relation �� of the 
resulting knowledge base 6.' ::::: t. U {a __,. b} ." 
which is clearly a proposition that can be tested in the 
language of default-based ranking systems. 
Note the essential distinction between having a condi­
tional rule a -- b explicitly in t. and certifying that 
a f:o: b holds in the consequence relation of .1. .  The 
former is a permanent constraint that interacts with 
other rules to shape the priority order z+ 1 while the 
latter indicates a contingent expectation ( certified by 
the Ramsey test) that passively reflects that ordering. 
This distinction gets lost in systems such as Spohn's 
or Giirdenfors ' [ 1 5] that do not acknowledge the cen­
trality of conditionals as the basis for generating and 
ranking beliefs. 20 
5 Conclusions 
This paper proposes a belief-revision system that rea­
sons tractably and plausibly with l inguisti c  quantifica­
tion of both observational reports (e.g. , "looks like" ) 
and domain rules (e.g . ,  "typically" ) .  We have shown 
that the system is semi-tractable, namely, tractable for 
every sublanguage in which propositional satisfiabil­
ity is polynomial ( Horn expressions, network theories, 
acyclic expressions, etc . ) .  To the best of our knowl­
edge, this is the first system that reasons with approx­
imate probabilities which offers such broad guarantees 
of tractability. 2 1  We expect these results to carry over 
to the theory of possibility as formulated by Dubois 
and Prade [12] ,  which has similar features to Spohn's 
system except that beliefs are measured on the real 
interval [0 , 1 ] . In addition we have shown that , with­
out loss of tractability, the system can also accommo­
date expressions of imprecise observations, thus pro-
18Gardenfors [ 1 4] attempts to devise postulates for con­
ditional sentences, but finds them incompatible with the 
Ramsey test (page 156-160) .  See also Boutilier [5] for an 
analysis of Ramsey test. and the AGM axioms 
1 �  Example due to Calabrese (personal communication) . 
20 Belief revision systems proposed in the database Jit.­
erature ( 1 :1 ,  9] suffer from the same shortcoming. In that 
context defaults ( and conditionals) represent integrity con­
straints with exceptions. 
2 1  Whereas most tractability results exploit the topolog­
ical structure of the knowledge base (hypertrees, or partial 
hypertrees ) ,  ours are topology-independent. 
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viding a good model for weighing the impact of ev­
idence and counter-evidence on our beliefs. Finally, 
we have shown that the enterprise of belief revision, 
as formulated in the work presented in [2] , can find a 
tractable and natural embodiment in system-z+ , un­
hindered by difficulties that plagued earlier systems. 
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